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How the EU Single Farm Payment should be modelled:  
lump-sum transfers, area payments or… what else? 
 
Abstract 
The 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform radically changes the way the European 
Union (EU) supports its agricultural sector by decoupling direct payments. Production is no 
longer  required  to  get  the  payment  attached  to  Single  Farm  Payment  (SFP)  entitlements. 
However,  the  new  scheme  maintains  a  specific  link  between  payments  and  hectares;  in 
addition, SFP entitlements can be exchanged among farmers. These features question the way 
SFP  entitlements  should  be  regarded,  hence  modelled,  i.e.,  as  lump-sum  transfers,  area 
payments or… something else. We develop a microeconomic analytical framework which 
shows  that  the  answer  crucially  depends  on  the  total  number  of  entitlements  which  are 
initially made available relative to the number of hectares, more specifically the number of 
cultivated hectares in a zero support regime, the number of cultivated hectares in a policy 
support regime trough per-hectare direct aids, and the number of cultivated or idled hectares 
in a policy regime where support is granted through direct aids per hectare and production is 
not required. 
Keywords: European Union, Common Agricultural Policy, Single Farm Payment, modelling, 
area payments, lump-sum transfers 
JEL Classification: Q18, Q12 
 
 
Comment modéliser les Droits au Paiement Unique de l’UE : transferts forfaitaires, 
aides à l’hectare ou… quoi d’autre ? 
 
Résumé 
Le  découplage  des  paiements  directs  adopté  lors  de  la  réforme  de  la  Politique  Agricole 
Commune  (PAC)  de  2003  modifie  radicalement  la  façon  dont  l’Union  Européenne  (UE) 
soutient son secteur agricole. Il n’y a plus d’obligation de production pour pouvoir prétendre 
au bénéfice de l’aide attachée aux Droits au Paiement Unique (DPU). Malgré cela, le nouveau Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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dispositif  maintient  un  lien  spécifique  entre  les  paiements  et  la  terre ;  de  plus,  les  DPU 
peuvent être échangés entre agriculteurs. Etant donné ces caractéristiques, la question de la 
modélisation des DPU se pose : sont-ils des transferts forfaitaires, des aides à la surface ou… 
autre chose ? Le cadre analytique microéconomique proposé ici montre que la réponse dépend 
fondamentalement  du  rapport  entre  le  nombre  total  de  droits  mis  en  circulation  à 
l’initialisation du dispositif et, premièrement, le nombre d’hectares qui seraient cultivés en 
l’absence  de  tout  soutien,  deuxièmement,  le  nombre  d’hectares  qui  seraient  cultivés  en 
présence  d’aides  directes  à  l’hectare,  et  troisièmement,  le  nombre  d’hectares  qui  seraient 
cultivés ou laissés en gel volontaire en présence d’aides directes à l’hectare sans obligation de 
production. 
Mots-clefs : Union Européenne, Politique Agricole Commune, Droit au Paiement Unique, 
modélisation, aides à la surface, transferts forfaitaires 
Classification JEL : Q18, Q12 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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How the EU Single Farm Payment should be modelled: 
lump-sum transfers, area payments or… what else? 
 
1.  Introduction 
On 26 June 2003, European Union (EU) farm ministers adopted a new reform of the Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP).  This  reform  radically  changes  the  way  the  EU  supports  its 
agricultural  sector.  Among  the  various  features  characterizing  the  horizontal  Council 
Regulation  (EC)  1782/2003  (essentially  modulation,  financial  discipline,  cross-compliance 
criteria  and  new  rural  development  measures),  the  decoupling  of  direct payments  granted 
through the so-called first pillar appears to be the most at odds with the previous policy 
inherited  from  the  1992  and  1999  reforms.
1  It  is  implemented  through  a  Single  Payment 
Scheme (SPS) which mitigates into a Single Farm Payment (SFP) a majority of the direct aids 
that were formerly granted per hectare (cereals, oilseeds and protein crops) and/or per animal 
head (beef, veal, sheep and goats).
2 
The SFP is broken down into a certain number of entitlements which in practice correspond to 
unit amounts of aids per hectare in so far as each entitlement has to be “accompanied by an 
eligible hectare” in order to “give right to the payment of the amount fixed by the payment 
entitlement”  (EC  1782/2003,  article  44).  As  a  result,  one  could  regard  SFP  entitlements 
simply as area payments. However, a second feature of the SPS makes SFP entitlements 
potentially  different  from  area  payments.  Whatever  the  national  implementation  model,
3 
actual  production  of  a  specific  commodity  among  those  which  are  eligible  is  no  longer 
                                                 
1 The first pillar of the CAP corresponds to traditional market support measures (export subsidies, intervention 
spending, etc.) and direct payments (including the Single Farm Payment scheme introduced in 2003). Rural 
development, agri-environmental and other accompanying measures define the second pillar 
2 The SPS also includes components originating from dairy and sugar beet payments which were introduced in 
2004 and 2006, respectively, in order to compensate for intervention price cuts in the milk and sugar sectors. 
From 2005 on, it includes payments granted to tobacco, cotton and olive oil. The 2007 reform of the Common 
Market Organisation (CMO) in fruit and vegetables integrates these products into the SPS. For details on these 
successive reforms, see the website of the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_en.htm). 
3 The reader is referred to the European Commission website for a detailed presentation of the 2003 CAP reform. 
In particular, Council Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 and Commission Regulations (EC) 795/2004, 796/2004 and 
118/2005 define the legal basis for direct payments, notably the various models (historic, regional or hybrid) a 
Member State can use for implementing the SPS. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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required to get the payment attached to entitlements, provided cross-compliance conditions 
are met on the corresponding hectares.
4 From that perspective, one could be inclined to look 
at the SFP as a lump-sum transfer to the farmer. 
From the previous presentation, a difficulty immediately arises. As noted by Bascou et al. 
(2004),  “(t)he  way  in  which  the  single  farm  payment  is  implemented  and  modelled  may 
notably influence producer decisions and the projected production patterns”. Though a model 
is clearly a simplification of reality, it is always most desirable to adopt an as explicit as 
possible representation of policies in models. This is the main objective of this paper which 
tries to bring some clarity into the debate on the way SFP entitlements should be modelled, 
more specifically as lump-sum transfers, area payments or… something else. To do so, we 
develop  a  simplified  microeconomic  production  framework  to  compare  three  situations 
corresponding  to,  respectively,  (i)  a  zero  support  regime,  (ii)  a  regime  where  support  is 
granted through direct aids per hectare and (iii) a regime where support is granted through the 
SPS.
5 The analytic approach we develop integrates the three main characteristics of the SPS 
that make payments a priori different from both lump-sum transfers and area subsidies. First, 
production is no longer required to get payments attached to entitlements. Second, the scheme 
maintains a specific link between payments and hectares through the so-called “activation 
constraint”, i.e., the obligation for a farmer to maintain in potential agricultural use (through 
the  respect  of  Good  Agricultural  and  Environmental  Conditions  (GAECs))  a  number  of 
eligible hectares at least equal to the number of SFP entitlements he holds to get the payment 
attached to the latter.
6 Third, SFP entitlements can be exchanged among farmers, necessarily 
with  a  concomitant  and  equivalent  land  transfer  in  the  case  of  a  temporary  entitlement 
transaction, with or without land transfer if the entitlement transaction is permanent. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews researches that used 
one of the two options described above (lump-sum transfers or area payments) to represent 
                                                 
4 That is as long as the farmer complies with environmental, animal and plant health, animal welfare and food 
safety standards, as well as he maintains land in Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions. 
5 Farmers are profit maximizers, there is no uncertainty and all markets are competitive. Hence the zero support 
regime also depicts a situation where agricultural income support is granted through lump-sum transfers (except 
that agricultural income is increased by an amount equal to these lump-sum transfers).  
6 Article 44.3 of the Council Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 specifically stipulates that “the parcels shall be at the 
farmer’s disposal for a period of at least 10 months” of the cropping year during which the payments are applied 
for. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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the  SFP.  Section  3  details  our  modelling  framework;  we  first  describe  the  zero  support 
regime; we then bring in direct aids per hectare equivalent to those which were in place in the 
EU  sector  of  cereals,  oilseeds  and protein  (COP)  crops  from  the  1992  CAP  reform  until 
2003;
7  finally,  direct  aids  per  hectare  are  replaced  by  SFP  entitlements.  The  concluding 
section summarises our findings and discusses their implications on how SFP entitlements 
should be represented in models.  
 
2.  How has the Single Payment Scheme been modelled so far? 
The lump-sum transfer solution 
Several  authors  have  modelled  the  SFP  as  a  lump-sum  transfer  granted  to  agricultural 
households. In a partial equilibrium (PE) setting (FAPRI-Ireland Partnership, 2003; Bascou et 
al.,  2004;  Breen  et  al.,  2005;  Schmid  et  al.,  2006),  such  a  transfer  cannot  be  explicitly 
accounted  for since the income formation of households is not modelled; as a result, the 
amount  corresponding  to  the  SFP  simply  accounts  for  zero  in  the  profit  maximisation 
behavior of agricultural producers. Under this assumption, the 2003 CAP payments have no 
impact at all on farmers’ production decisions, input use (especially land demands) and output 
supply (especially yields). 
In a general equilibrium (GE) setting (Gohin, 2004; Gelan and Schwarz, 2006), the income 
formation of consumers is modelled and the lump-sum transfer equivalent to the total amount 
of the SFP is explicitly introduced as accruing to households. Within this framework, the 
production-decision side is not affected by the SFP. Nevertheless, a certain wealth effect can 
come into play on the consumption side in so far as the increase in consumers’ income can 
affect their decisions in terms of both resource allocation and income spending. It should be 
noted though that, in the examples cited  above, agricultural households are not explicitly 
accounted for, as only a single representative consumer agent is considered. As a result, the 
SFP is “diluted” as if it were a very generic transfer to all households, agricultural households 
as well as non-agricultural households. 
                                                 
7 Per-hectare direct aids granted to COP crops can be maintained in Member States which decide to decouple 
only partially in the COP sector. However, unit per-hectare amounts are considerably reduced with respect to 
pre-2003 levels. Only France and Spain chose to maintain the support in the COP sector partially coupled. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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In short, when the new EU payments are modelled as lump-sum transfers, they de facto do not 
affect output supply and input use, in particular the land demand addressed by farmers to land 
owners. They do not capitalize into land prices and rents. Models that have adopted this first 
approach effectively conclude that decoupling should result in land rents to decrease sharply 
relative to the pre-2003 situation, e.g., -80 % in Gohin (2004). 
 
The area payment solution 
The second approach adopted by modellers is to consider SFP entitlements just as if they were 
area payments. This alternative solution has been adopted in PE models (Junker et al., 2003; 
Binfeld et al., 2003; Binfeld et al., 2004; Huettel et al., 2005; Balkhausen et al., 2005; Buysse 
et al., 2007) and GE frameworks (Frandsen et al., 2003; Jensen and Frandsen, 2004; Gohin, 
2004, 2006).
8 It is not our purpose here to discuss whether area payments such as those in 
place in the EU COP sector since 1992 have been satisfactorily or not represented in models 
so far. However, we do need to briefly describe how they have been actually modelled in 
order  to  understand  implications  regarding  the  effects  of  SFP  entitlements  when  they  are 
introduced as area payments.  
Most PE models do not explicitly represent factor markets, notably the land factor market. 
Even when they include a land allocation mechanism, and hence product-specific land derived 
demand equations, they generally do not compute equilibrium land rental prices which could 
enter these land demand functions. As a result, it is not possible to specify land demand 
equations in which the land price net of the area payment could be an explicit argument. To 
overcome this limitation, area payments are then introduced as a complement to the output 
price in equations that determine the areas devoted to each eligible crop.
9 In order to account 
for the fact that the supply-inducing effects of area payments are less than the impacts of 
output price support, the OECD AGLINK model multiplies area payments by a  coupling 
factor of 0.14 (OECD, 2004). As noted by Gohin (2006), only the OECD justifies the value 
retained for the coupling factor relying on a policy simulation analysis performed with the 
                                                 
8 Gohin (2004, 2006) is actually one of the few who compares the effects of considering 2003 EU payments as 
either lump-sum transfers or area subsidies. 
9 Area payments are then expressed per ton of product. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Policy Evaluation Model (PEM) which integrates the land market (Dewbre et al., 2001)
10 The 
value of the coupling factor adopted in other PE models is not justified. In practice, it varies 
between  zero  and  one  reflecting  essentially  a  priori  believes  of  modellers  (Gohin,  2006; 
Balkhausen et al., 2007). 
By contrast, GE models do represent the land market. Area payments can then be explicitly 
introduced in agricultural land demand equations by lowering the endogenous rental price of 
land.  In  a  general  way,  GE  models  allocate  land  according  to  constant  elasticity  of 
transformation (CET) functions which capture the constrained mobility of total available land 
among competing uses. As a result, there are several land rental prices reflecting the fact that 
land is, in practice, a heterogeneous production factor. GE models, as well as PE models 
which explicitly include the land market, can be used to address the issue of agricultural 
support  capitalisation  into  land  prices  and  rents.  They  however  suffer  from  two  main 
drawbacks. First, their agricultural area coverage is incomplete since in many cases, several 
agricultural land uses are not included (fodder and pasture area, voluntary set-aside area, etc.). 
In  addition,  the  models’  product  aggregation  is  not  always  fully  consistent  with  the  one 
retained by policymakers. Second, as rightfully pointed out by Gohin (2006), EU land rental 
prices net of per-hectare direct payments are generally negative.
11 Gohin (2006) explains this 
very  partial  capitalisation  of  area  payments  into  land  prices  by  two  factors:  land  price 
capitalisation  takes  time  in  particular  because  land-leasing  contracts  are  long-term 
arrangements that are very difficult to renegotiate; there are rigidities and imperfections in 
agricultural  production  factor  markets,  not  only  the  land  market,  due  to  notably  national 
regulations on farmland uses and prices, but also the labour and capital markets. Accordingly, 
Gohin (2006) argues that it is not unreasonable to model pre-2003 area payments, for a part as 
land subsidies, for the remaining  as labour/capital subsidies.  In his empirical analysis, he 
assumes an equal sharing. He immediately recognizes that this choice is somewhat arbitrary.  
                                                 
10 By contrast to other PE models, the PEM developed by the OECD includes a land market modelling which is 
very similar to the one adopted in GE frameworks. 
11 See also von Witzke et al. (2007) who conclude that in a typical German farm, the 2005/06 land rental price 
would be negative in the absence of agricultural subsidies. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Let us now consider how SFP entitlements are dealt with in simulation models where they are 
introduced as area payments. Under this assumption, the 2003 CAP decoupling is depicted as 
a switch from area payments restricted to COP crops, as well as mandatory set-aside, to non-
product-specific  direct  aids  per  hectare  for  all  eligible  areas.  In  the  AGLINK  model  for 
example, the SFP affects only the first stage of the three-step area allocation system, i.e., the 
decision relating to the choice between the total area for cereals and oilseeds on the one hand, 
the total area for  fodder crops and pasture on the other hand. Subsequent area allocation 
decisions depend only on relative returns (OECD, 2004). To reflect the lower degree of SFP 
entitlements as compared to the pre-2003 area payments, the coupling factor is now set to 
0.06 (instead of 0.14 for area payments). This lower figure is based on Dewbre et al. (2001) 
who showed that area payments requiring planting of specific crops are slightly more trade 
distorting than payments not requiring planting of specific crops. The other models which also 
adopt the coupling factor approach do not justify the choice of the coefficient ascribed to SFP 
entitlements. The coefficient is generally assumed lower than the one associated with pre-
2003 area payments (0.15 versus 0.50 for the FAPRI-GOLD model, Binfield et al., 2003; 
Binfield et al., 2004), but it is sometimes maintained unchanged (1 for the ESIM model, 
Balkhausen et al., 2005).
12  
 
3.  The microeconomic framework 
The microeconomic framework developed below takes explicitly into account the three main 
characteristics of the 2003 EU SPS, i.e., (i) the activation constraint, (ii) the free tradability of 
SFP entitlements and (iii) the fact that production is no longer required but cross-compliance 
criteria apply. The model is developed progressively. In a first step, we introduce the two first 
characteristics (section 3.3). In the second step, we add the third feature (section 3.4). We 
begin the presentation by defining the two comparison regimes, i.e., first the zero support 
regime or, equivalently here, the lump-sum transfer regime (section 3.1), second a regime of 
per-hectare  direct  aids  (section  3.2).  It  is  from  this  comparison  that  we  will  derive 
implications on how SPF entitlements should be modeled. 
 
                                                 
12 For a review, see Balkhausen et al. (2007), Table 4. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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3.1.  The zero support regime 
We consider a two-producer agricultural economy. Each farmer  2 , 1 = i  maximizes his profit 
according to the following program: 
) , , , ( )] , , ( ; [ max , i i i i i i i i i i i i h x l r w p l h x f y rh wx y p q º = - - ,  (1) 
where  i p  is the output price,  i y  is the output level,  w is the vector of variable input prices, 
i x  is the vector of variable input quantities, r  is the land rental price,  i h  is the land quantity, 
) , , ( i i i i l h x f   is  a  well-behaved  production  function  with  i l   the  (fixed)  family  labour 
endowment of farmer i. 
We retain three simplifying assumptions in order to make things manageable and analytical 
results more easily interpretable. These assumptions do not alter general conclusions of our 
analysis.  First,  output  and  variable  input  equilibrium  prices  are  assumed  exogenous  and 
constant.
13 Second, land is acquired or let through rental only; the buying or selling price of 
land is assumed to be adequately approximated by the discounted sum of future rental values 
so that a prediction about the direction of the land rental price is equivalent to a prediction 
about  the  direction  of  the  buying  or  selling  land  price  (Leathers,  1992).  Finally,  land 
endowments of farmers are supposed null. 
Program (1) defines a profit function  ) , , , ( i i i l r w p q  which is assumed twice continuously 
differentiable, non negative, non decreasing in output price, non increasing in input prices, 
non decreasing in family labour quantity, linearly homogeneous and convex in prices, and 
concave in family labour quantity (Diewert, 1974). The land demand function for farmer i is 
obtained  by  differentiation  of  his  profit  function  with  respect  to  the  land  rental  price 
(Hotelling’s lemma): 
r l r w p l r w p h i i i i i i ¶ -¶ º / ) , , , ( ) , , , ( q .   (2) 
The  land  market  equilibrium  is  then  defined  by  equating  farmers’  land  demands  to  land 
supply, i.e., 







i i r L l r w p h ∑
=
= ,  (3) 
                                                 
13 We do not impose that the two farmers produce the same output. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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where  ) (r L  is the land supply function to the farm sector by landowners, with  0 / ) ( ³ ¶ ¶ r r L . 
Equation (3) solved for  r  defines the equilibrium land rental price, 
wp r , as a function of 
output and variable input prices, as well as family labour endowments. 
The  land  market  is  depicted  in  Figure  1  where  equilibrium  occurs  at  point 
wp E ,  for  an 
equilibrium land rental price of 
wp r . For this equilibrium land rental price, farmer 1 leases in 
the  land  quantity  ) , , , ( 1 1 1 1 l r w p h h
wp wp º   and  farmer  2  leases  in  the  land  quantity 
) , , , ( 2 2 2 2 l r w p h h
wp wp º . 
 
3.2.  Introducing directs aids per hectare 
In a regime where agricultural income support is granted through direct aids per hectare, 
program (1) becomes: 
) , , , ( )] , , ( ; [ max , i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i h x l a r w p l h x f y h a rh wx y p - º = + - - q ,  (4) 
where  i a  denotes the per-hectare direct aid for farmer i.
14 
As in the case of zero support, the land demand function of each farmer is defined by the 
derivative of the profit function with respect to the land rental price, and the land market 
equilibrium is obtained when aggregate demand for land equals land supply: 













i i r L l a r w p h r l a r w p ∑ ∑
= =
= - = ¶ - ¶ - q .  (5) 




                                                 
14 We do not constrain per-hectare direct aids to be equal for the two farmers since we do not impose that they 
both produce the same output (see note 13). However, we do not allow a given farmer to shift, even partially, 
from one production to another. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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The comparative static of the land rental equilibrium price in this policy regime is determined 
by totally differentiating (5) and solving for 
a dr :
15 


























.  (6) 
The response of individual land demands to changes in per-hectare direct aids is obtained by 
differentiating each derived land demand function  ) , , , ( i i i i l a r w p h - , evaluated at equilibrium 
land rental price, with respect to direct aids. For farmer 1 one yields: 
).
] / / [
. / ) ( . /
( . /
)
] / / [
. /
( . /











































¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶
¶ ¶ - - ¶ ¶
¶ -¶ =
-
¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶
¶ ¶
¶ -¶ =














  (7) 
Equation (7) shows that per-hectare direct aids granted to the first product (equivalently here 
the first producer) have a positive impact on land allocated to the first product (positive own-
aid effect). By contrast, per-hectare direct aids granted to the second product (equivalently 
here  the  second  producer)  have  a  negative  impact  on  land  allocated  to  the  first  product 
(negative cross-aid effect).  
The response of total land demand to changes in per-hectare direct aids is readily obtained as 
the sum 
a a a dh dh dH 2 1 + = : 
] / / [
















¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶








.  (8) 
                                                 
15 Equation (6) assumes that output and variable input prices, as well as family labour endowments, are kept 
constant. One easily shows that the equilibrium land rental price is an increasing function of output prices and, as 
a result, that an output price support policy also capitalizes, at least partially, into land prices. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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In the case where the land supply function is not perfectly inelastic ( 0 / > ¶ ¶ r L ), per-hectare 
direct aids are coupled at the extensive margin of production since they increase aggregate 
land used in the farm sector. In the specific case where the land supply function is perfectly 
inelastic ( 0 / = ¶ ¶ r L ), they have no impact on aggregate land used in the farm sector. 
We summarise the previous analysis by the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. Direct aids per hectare capitalize at least partially in land prices. The lower 
the  land  supply  elasticity,  the  higher  the  capitalization  in  land  prices.  Capitalization  is 
complete  when  per-hectare  direct  aids  are  identical  for  all  outputs  and  the  land  supply 
function is perfectly inelastic. Own effects of per-hectare direct aids are positive and cross 
effects are negative. Except in the specific case where the land supply function is perfectly 
inelastic, direct aids per hectare increase total land used in the farm sector. 
 
3.3.  The SPS assuming that production is required 
Producer maximization program 
In the SFP policy regime, each producer maximizes his profit according to the following 
program: 
] 0 ; ) , , ( ; ) ( [ max
0
, , i i i i i i i i i i i i i i n h x h n l h x f y n n v bn rh wx y p £ £ = - - + - - ,  (9a) 
where b  is the unit value of payment entitlements,  i n  is the number of entitlements for farmer 
i, v is the rental price of entitlements, and 
0
i n  is the initial entitlement endowment for farmer 
i. For convenience, payment entitlements are assumed to be acquired or let through rental 
only. For the sake of simplicity, we also consider that they exhibit the same unit value  b  
whatever the farmer.
16 
                                                 
16 This assumption does not alter our findings regarding the modelling of the SPS. When unit values of SFP 
entitlements differ among farmers, we have to consider as many entitlement rental prices as entitlement unit 
values. However, one shows that equilibrium entitlement rental prices then verify  0 ³ = - d v b i i , where d is a 
non-negative common value, whatever the farmer i (intuitively, this occurs to exhaust arbitration possibilities, 
i.e., the possibility for a farmer, say 1, to make a gain by selling his equilibrium entitlement demand and buying 
the same quantity from another farmer, say k, in a situation where  k k b v b v - > - 1 1 ). All the results derived in 
the text remain valid since, as we  will show, what matters in behavioural and equilibrium equations is the 
difference  i i v b -  for all farmers i. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
 
  15 
From equation (9a), one sees that the SPS induces three main differences in the producer 
maximisation program with respect to the regime of direct aids per hectare (equation (4)). 
First,  total  payments  received  by  farmer  i  are  no  longer  proportionate  to  the  number  of 
hectares  i h  he demands but to the number of entitlements  i n  he claims for. Second, the 
difference  ) (
0
i i n n v -  represents either the costs of renting in additional payments at a price v 
per unit or the earnings of renting out part or all of the initial payment endowment, also at a 
price  v  per  unit;  this  accounts  for  the  tradable  nature  of  SFP  entitlements.  Third,  the 
inequality constraint  i i h n £  captures the fact that payments are granted only for entitlements 
for which the farmer i holds an eligible hectare; this is the way we represent the “activation 
constraint”. 
Program (9a) can equivalently be written as: 
] 0 ; ) ( ) , , , ( [ max
0
, i i i i i i i i i i n h h n n n v bn rh l h w p £ £ - - + - p ,  (9b) 
where  ) , , , ( i i i i l h w p p  is a well-behaved profit function defined for a given land quantity: 
)] , , ( ; [ max ) , , , ( i i i i i i i i x i i i i l h x f y wx y p l h w p = - º p .  (9c) 
The first-order necessary conditions for program (9b) are: 
0 / ) ( = + - ¶ ¶ l p r h hi i ,  (10a) 
0 = - + - l m v b ,  (10b) 
0 . = i n m ,  (10c) 
0 ) ( . = - i i n h l ,  (10d) 
where m  and l  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the inequality constraints  i n £ 0  
and  i i h n £ , respectively. 
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Land and entitlement demand functions 
Equations (10a) to (10d) allow deriving the land demand function and the entitlement net 
demand  function  for  farmer  i  as  follows.
17  Let  us  first  assume  that  b v < .  Under  this 
assumption,  0 > l  (from (10b)),  i i h n =  (from (10d)),  0 = m  (from (10c) and because we 
focus on the case where  0 > i h ) and  b v r h hi i - + = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  (from (10a)). Let us now assume 
that  b v = . Under this assumption,  0 = = l m  (from (10b), (10c) and (10d)),  r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  
(from (10a)) and  i i h n £ £ 0 . Finally, let us assume that  b v > . Under this assumption,  0 > m  
(from (10b)),  0 = i n  (from (10c)),  0 = l  (from (10d)) and  r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  (from (10a)). To 
sum up: 
when  b v < ,  b v r h hi i - + = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  and  i i h n = ,  (11a) 
when  b v = ,  r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  and  i i h n £ £ 0 ,  (11b) 
when  b v > ,  r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  and  0 = i n .  (11c) 
 
Land and entitlement market equilibriums 
Let us now turn to land and entitlement market equilibriums. The land market equilibrium 
requires that aggregate land demand equals aggregate land supply. The entitlement market 
equilibrium condition requires that the total number of entitlements activated by farmers is 
lower than or equal to the global endowment in entitlements denoted 
0 N . Three regimes have 
to be distinguished depending on whether 
wp H N £
0 , 
b wp H N H £ £
0 , or 
0 N H
b £ , where 
wp H  is total agricultural land used in the zero support reference situation and 
b H  is the 
number of hectares which would be demanded in a support regime of per-hectare direct aids 
of unit amount equal to the entitlement unit value b . Annex details why these three regimes 
have to be considered. 
 
                                                 
17 The analysis excludes the uninteresting case where the land rental price is so high that the marginal profit of 
the first hectare is lower than the land rental price. In other words, as previously noted, we only consider the case 
where  0 > i h . Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Regime 1.  ) (
0 wp wp r L H N = £  
In that first regime, the initial number of entitlements is lower than or equal to the number of 
hectares which would be demanded in the zero support policy reference situation. One then 
shows that market equilibrium conditions may be defined as (proof in Annex 1): 
b v
s = ,  (12a) 






i ¶ -¶ = = / ) , , , ( ) , , , ( q ,  (12b) 







i i r L l r w p h = ∑
=













,  (12e) 
where the subscript s denotes equilibrium variables in this first SFP regime. 
In  that  first  regime,  the  equilibrium  rental  price  of  entitlements  equals  the  unit  value  of 
entitlements (equation (12a)). With respect to the zero support situation, the SFP scheme has 
no impact on individual land demands (equation (12b)), the aggregate land quantity used in 
the farm sector and the land rental price (equation (12c) which is identical to equation (3)). 
The total number of payment entitlements effectively used by the farmers is equal to the 
initial  endowment  in  entitlements  (first  part  of  equation  (12e)).  There  are  entitlement 
exchanges from the over-endowed farmer (if he exists) towards the under-endowed farmer (if 
he  exists).
18  Both  the  over-endowed  farmer  and  the  under-endowed  farmer  gain  from 
exchanging  payment  entitlements  relative  to  a  regime  where  entitlements  cannot  be 
exchanged. This can be shown graphically as follows. 
Figure 2 corresponds to the limit case where 
wp H N =
0 . In the zero support regime, farmer 1 
demands  ) ( 1 1
wp wp r h h =   hectares  and  farmer  2  demands  ) ( 2 2
wp wp r h h =   hectares  with 
). ( 2 1
wp wp wp wp r L H h h = = +   Initial  endowments  in  entitlements  are 
wp h n 1
0
1 >   and 
wp h n 2
0
2 <  
such that 






                                                 
18 A farmer will be said over-endowed (respectively under-endowed) when his initial endowment in entitlements 
is strictly higher (lower) than the number of hectares he would demand under a zero support regime. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Figure 2. The land market equilibrium in the SFP support regime without the possibility not to produce when the number of 
entitlements 


































1 h h =




















(a) The case illustrated is the limit case where 
wp H N =
0  (where 
wp H  is the total area demanded in a zero support regime). The superscripts s and sne 
denote equilibrium variables, respectively when SFP entitlements are tradable and when they cannot be exchanged. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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(i) Let us first assume that payment entitlements cannot be exchanged. Under this assumption, 
the aggregate land demand curve is represented by the broken line  XYZ ABCDE
sne  (i.e., the 
horizontal sum of demand curves  abdehx  and  ABFMOP ). The land market equilibrium 
occurs at point 
sne E  (where the superscript sne denotes equilibrium variables in this regime of 
non-tradable SFP entitlements) where land demand and supply  curves intersect. The land 
rental  price  increases  from 
wp r   to 
sne r ,  and  land  used  in  the  farm  sector  increases  from 
) (
wp wp r L H =  to  ) (
sne sne r L H = . With no trade in entitlements, the SFP scheme results in an 
increase in total land used in the farm sector; the over-endowed farmer 1 increases his land 
demand to 
sne h1  where  b r h h
sne sne - = ¶ ¶ / ) ( 1 1 p  while the under-endowed farmer 2 decreases 
his land demand to 
sne h2  where 
sne sne r h h = ¶ ¶ / ) ( 2 2 p . With respect to the zero support regime, 
farmer 1 unambiguously gains because area  AFJG  is greater than area  IJLK .
19 Farmer 2 
gains area abdg  but looses area  K Ieh , the net outcome depending on whether area abdg  is 
greater or smaller than area  K Ieh . The over-endowed farmer 1 does not use all his initial 
endowment in entitlements, and the under-endowed farmer 2 demands a number of hectares 
greater than his initial entitlement endowment. 
(ii) Let us now assume that payment entitlements can be exchanged. Under this assumption, 
the aggregate land demand is the broken line  YZ GNE
wp  and there is no impact on the land 
market: the equilibrium land rental price is 
wp s r r = , individual land demands are 
wp s h h 1 1 =  for 
farmer 1 and 
wp s h h 2 2 =  for farmer 2, and total land used in the farm sector is 
wp s H H =  (where 
the  superscript  s  denotes  equilibrium  variables  in  this  regime  of  tradable  SFP).  The  SFP 
scheme  is  decoupled  at  the  extensive  margin  of  production.  The  over-endowed  farmer  1 
leases out the entitlement quantity 
s h n 1
0
1 -  at price  b = n  which is leased in by the under-
endowed farmer 2. With respect to the zero support regime, the over-endowed farmer 1 gains 
area  AMOG . With respect to the non tradable SFP regime, he gains  JFMO IJLK + . With 
respect  to  the  zero  support  regime,  the  under-endowed  farmer  2  gains  area  abdg .  With 
respect to the non tradable SFP regime, he gains  K Ieh . Relative to the non tradable regime, 
both producers thus benefit from exchanging payment entitlements. 
The following proposition summarizes the previous analysis. 
                                                 
19 Farmer 1 gains area AFHG = AFJG + JFH and looses area IFHLK = IJLK + JFH. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Proposition 2. When the initial number of payment entitlements is lower than or equal to the 
number  of  hectares  that  farmers  would  demand  in  a  zero  support  regime,  introducing 
tradable single farm payments has no impact on the land market: the land rental price, the 
total agricultural area and farmers’ land demands are unchanged. All payment entitlements 
are  activated,  and  there  are  entitlement  exchanges  from  the  over-endowed  farmer  (if  he 
exists) towards the under-endowed farmer (if he exists). 
 
Regime 2. 
b wp wp H N r L H £ £ =
0 ) (  
In that second regime, the initial number of entitlements is greater than or equal to the number 
of hectares which would be demanded in the zero support policy scenario (
0 N H
wp £ ), and 
lower than or equal to the number of hectares which would be demanded in a regime where 
support would be granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  (
b H N £
0  where 








b r L l b r w p H = - ¶ - =∑
=
q ).  In  that  case,  equilibrium 
conditions may be written as (proof in Annex): 
b v
s £ £ 0 ,  (13a) 






i ¶ - + -¶ = - + = / ) , , , ( ) , , , ( q ,  (13b) 
0 ) ( N r L
s = ,  (13c) 







i i r L l b v r w p h = - + ∑
=














.  (13f) 
In that second regime, the equilibrium rental price of entitlements is lower than or equal to 
their unit value (equation (13a)). SFP entitlements now have an impact on individual land 
demands  (equation  (13b)).  Equation  (13d)  defines  the  equilibrium  entitlement  price  for  a 
given  equilibrium  land  rental  price  defined  by  equation  (13c).  One  easily  verifies  that 
wp s r r =  and  b v
s =  when 
wp H N =
0 . The effects of a change in the number of entitlements Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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on land and entitlement equilibrium prices are obtained by differentiating equations (13c) and 
(13d) with respect to 
0 N : 
1 0 ) / ( /
- ¶ ¶ = r L dN dr
s ,  (14a) 
] ) / ( ) / [( /
1 1 0 ∑
- - ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ - = r r L dN dv i q .  (14b) 
An increase in the number of entitlements raises the land rental price (equation (14a)) and 
diminishes the entitlement rental price (equation (14b)). The equilibrium land rental price is 
thus an increasing function in the number of payment entitlements, rising from 
wp s r r =  when 
wp H N =
0   to 
b s r r =   when 
b H N =
0 .  The  equilibrium  entitlement  rental  price  is  a 
decreasing function in the number of payment entitlements, diminishing from  b v
s =  when 
wp H N =
0  to  0 =
s v  when 
b H N =
0 . 
From equation (13b), one verifies that individual land demands increase with the total number 
of entitlements because: 









s r dN dv dN dr q ,  (15) 
and hence, 
0 ) / / ( . / /




i q .  (16) 
The following proposition restates the previous analysis. 
Proposition 3. When the initial number of entitlements is strictly greater than the number of 
hectares which would be demanded in the zero support policy reference situation (
0 N H
wp < ) 
and lower than or equal to the number of hectares which would be demanded in a regime 
where  support  would  be  granted  through  direct  aids  per  hectare  of  unit  amount  b  
(
b H N £
0 ), then single farm payments increase the demand for land and capitalize into land 
rental prices. The higher the number of entitlements, the higher the impact on land demanded 
by the farm sector, the higher the land rental price and the capitalization into land rental 
prices, and the lower the entitlement rental price. 
Proposition  3  is  illustrated  by  Figure  3.  As  shown  in  proposition  2,  the  land  market 
equilibrium is not modified when 
wp H N =
0  (case illustrated by a number of entitlements 
equal to 
) 1 ( 0 N  in Figure 3). This is no longer the case when 
wp H N >
0  (case illustrated by a 
number of entitlements equal to 
) 2 ( 0 N  in Figure 3): the land market equilibrium then occurs at Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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the intersection 
) 2 ( s E  of the land supply curve  ) (r L  with the vertical straight line originating 
from 
) 2 ( 0 N ;  land  and  entitlement  equilibrium  rental  prices  are 
wp s s r r r = >
) 1 ( ) 2 (   and 
b v v
s s = <
) 1 ( ) 2 (  respectively; land used in the farm sector is 
wp H N >
) 2 ( 0 ; and individual land 
demands are 




1 = >  for farmer 1 and 




2 = >  for farmer 2. Figure 3 is 
depicted assuming that farmer 1 has an “excess” of entitlements (in the sense where his initial 
entitlement endowment 
) 2 ( 0
1 n  is strictly greater than the number of hectares 
) 2 (
1
s h  he demands). 
By  construction,  farmer  2  has  a  “deficit”  of  entitlements  (in  the  sense  where  his  initial 
entitlement endowment 
) 2 ( 0
2 n  is strictly lower than the number of hectares 
) 2 (
2
s h  he demands). 
Under this assumption, farmer 1 will lease out the entitlement quantity 
) 2 (
1
) 2 ( 0
1
s h n -  at a unit 
price 
) 2 ( s v  to farmer 2.
20 Using a graphical reasoning similar as the one used in the previous 
regime where 
wp H N <
0  (see Figure 2), one shows that both farmers gain from exchanging 
entitlements relative to a non tradable SFP regime. Finally, let us consider the upper bound 
corresponding to 
b H N =
0  (case illustrated by a number of entitlements equal to 
) 3 ( 0 N  in 
Figure  3):  in  that  case,  the  equilibrium  land  rental  price  is 
) 3 ( s r   and  the  equilibrium 
entitlement rental price 
) 3 ( s v  collapses to zero. 
 
 
                                                 
20 
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Figure 3. Land market equilibria in the SFP support regime without the possibility not to produce for different initial global 
endowments in entitlements 
0 N , with 
0 N  greater than the number of hectares demanded in a zero support regime 
(a). 
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wp H  is the total area demanded in a zero support regime and 
b H  is the total number of hectares that would be demanded in a policy regime where 
support would be granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b .Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Regime 3. 
0 N H
b £  
In that third regime, the initial number of entitlements is greater than or equal to the number 
of hectares which would be demanded in a regime where support would be granted through 
direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  (
b H N ³
0 ). In that case, equilibrium conditions are 
defined by (proof in Annex): 
0 =
s v ,  (17a) 






i ¶ - -¶ = - = / ) , , , ( ) , , , ( q ,  (17b) 







i i r L l b r w p h = - ∑
=












i £ = ∑
=
.  (17e) 
In that regime, the equilibrium entitlement rental price is zero (equation (17a)). Individual 
land demands are defined by equation (17b) and the land market equilibrium by equation 
(17c). The latter shows the equilibrium rental price is the one that would occur in a regime 
where the support would be granted through per-hectare direct aids of unit amount  b , i.e., 
b s r r = .  As  a  result,  the  total  number  of  demanded  hectares  is 
b s s H h h = + 2 1 .  Finally  it 
follows from this equality and equation (17d) that the number of demanded entitlements is 
b s s s s s H h h n n N = + = + = 2 1 2 1  (left part of equation (17e)). Starting from an initial entitlement 
endowment 
b H N =
0 , one verifies that increasing the total number of entitlements over 
b H  
has no impact on land and entitlement market equilibriums; but when 
b H N >
0 , there are 
b H N -
0  SFP entitlements which are not activated. 
The following proposition summarizes the previous analysis. 
Proposition 4. When the initial number of entitlements is greater than or equal to the number 
of hectares which would be demanded in a regime where support would be granted through 
direct  aids  per  hectare  of  unit  amount  b (
b H N ³
0 ),  the  equilibrium  rental  price  of 
entitlements  is  zero  while  the  equilibrium  rental  price  of  land  and  the  total  number  of 
demanded hectares are the same as if the support was granted through direct aids per hectare 
of unit amount b . When 
b H N >
0 , there are 
b H N -
0 inactivated SFP entitlements. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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3.4.  Introducing the possibility not to produce on eligible hectares 
Producer maximization program 
We now introduce the third characteristic of the SPS, i.e., the possibility not to produce on 
hectares that however can activate payment entitlements. This possibility is constrained by the 
fact that non-cultivated hectares be maintained in GAECs. Let us denote  ) ( i i m CJ  the cost 
function for farmer i of maintaining  i m  non-cultivated hectares in GAECs. This cost function 
) ( i i m CJ  is assumed positive, non decreasing and concave in land quantity. Assuming that 
there is no specific cost of maintaining land in GAECs on cultivated hectares, the cost of 
maintaining  i g  non-cultivated hectares in GAECs when  i h  hectares are already cultivated can 
then be expressed as: 
) ( ) ( ) , ( i i i i i i i i h CJ g h CJ g h C - + = .  (18) 
One immediately verifies that the marginal cost of maintaining non-cultivated hectares in 
GAECs does not decrease with the number  i g  of non-cultivated hectares and the number  i h  
of cultivated hectares ( 0 / ) ( / ) ( / ) , ( ³ ¶ ¶ - ¶ + ¶ = ¶ ¶ h h CJ h g h CJ h g h C i i i i i i i i ). 
The producer maximization program (9b) now becomes: 
]. 0 ; 0
); ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , ( [ max
0
, ,
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i n g h
g g h n
h CJ g h CJ n n v bn g h r wx l h w p
£ + £ £
+ + - - - + + - - p
  (19) 
The first-order conditions associated with this program (19) can be expressed as: 
0 / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( = + ¶ ¶ + ¶ + ¶ - - ¶ ¶ l p h h CJ h g h CJ r h h i i i i i i i ,  (20a) 
0 / ) ( = + + ¶ + ¶ - - h l g g h CJ r i i i ,  (20b) 
0 = + - - m l v b ,  (20c) 
0 ) ( = - + i i i n g h l ,  (20d) 
0 = i n m ,  (20e) 
0 = i g h ,  (20f) 
where  l ,  m   and  h   are  the  positive  Lagrange  multipliers  associated  with  the  inequality 
constraints  i i i g h n + £ ,  i n £ 0  and  i g £ 0 , respectively. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Plugging (20b) into (20a), one yields: 
0 / ) ( / ) ( = - ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ h p h h CJ h h i i i i .  (20g) 
 
Land and entitlement demand functions 
In what follows, we only consider the “interesting” case corresponding to an entitlement price 
v strictly lower than the unit value b . When  b v ³ , the demand for idled hectares maintained 
in  GAECs  is  null  and  we  are  brought  back  to  equation  (11b)  and  (11c)  of  the  previous 
subsection. This last result can be shown as follows. Let us assume that  b v = : in that case, 
0 = = m l  (from (20c), (20d) and (20e)) and hence,  h - = ¶ + ¶ - r g g h CJ i i i / ) (  (from (20b)) 
which is possible if and only if  0 > h , i.e., if and only if  0 = i g . In the same way, when  b v > , 
0 > m   (from  (20c)),  0 = i n   (from  (20e)),  0 = l   (from  (20d))  and  hence, 
h - = ¶ + ¶ - r g g h CJ i i i / ) (  (from (20b)) which is possible if and only if  0 = i g . 
We thus only consider an entitlement price regime such that  b v < . Under this assumption, 
0 > l  (from (20c)),  i i i g h n + =  (from (20d)) and  0 = m  (from (20e)). First-order conditions 
(20a), (20b) and (20f) can then be expressed as: 
b v r h h CJ h g h CJ h h i i i i i i i - + = ¶ ¶ + ¶ + ¶ - ¶ ¶ / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( p ,  (20’a) 
h - - + = ¶ + ¶ - b v r g g h CJ i i i / ) ( ,  (20’b) 
0 = i g h .  (20’f) 
Equation (20’a) shows that the number of hectares demanded for cultivation decreases with 
respect to the situation considered in the previous sub-section where the possibility not to 
produce on eligible hectares was not taken into account (for identical land and entitlement 
prices): this arises because  0 / ) ( / ) ( ³ ¶ ¶ - ¶ + ¶ h h CJ h g h CJ i i i i i . Let us then assume that there 
exists a strictly positive number of hectares  i h
~




( < = ¶ -¶ = ¶ ¶ i i i i i c h h CJ h h p ; 
i h
~
 exists if and only if  0 / ) ( / ) (
2 2 2 2 < ¶ ¶ < ¶ ¶ h h CJ h h i i i i p , an inequality which is supposed 
satisfied from now on. Equation (20g) then shows that the number of hectares demanded for 
cultivation  i h  is lower than or equal to this threshold  i h
~
. Two sub-cases have then to be 
distinguished depending on  b h h CJ i i + ¶ ¶ - / )
~
(  is positive or negative. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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In  the  first  sub-case  when  0 / )
~
( £ + ¶ ¶ - b h h CJ i i ,  let  us  assume  that  the  land  demand  for 
idling under GAECs is strictly positive ( 0 > i g ). In that case,  0 = h  (from (20’f)), equation 
(20g)  becomes  0 / ) ( / ) ( = ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ h h CJ h h i i i i p   (the  number  of  hectares  demanded  for 
cultivation  is  equal  to  the  threshold  i h
~
),  and  equation  (20’b)  reduces  to 
v r b h g h CJ i i i + = + ¶ + ¶ - / ) (   which  is  impossible  for  0 > i g   under  the  assumption 
0 / ) (
2 2 < ¶ ¶ h h CJ i i . As a result, the land demand for idling under GAECs is null and we are 
brought back to the first regime of the previous subsection 3.3. More specifically, the land 
demand function for cultivation is defined by equation (21a), the land demand function for 
idling  under  GAECs  by  equation  (21b)  and  the  entitlement  demand  function  by  equation 
(21c): 
b v r h hi i - + = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p ,  (21a) 
0 = i g ,  (21b) 
i i h n = .  (21c) 
In the second sub-case when  0 / )
~
( > + ¶ ¶ - b h h CJ i i , the land demand for idling under GAECs 
can be positive if the sum of the land price plus the entitlement price is sufficiently low. More 
specifically: 
(i) When  b g h CJ v r i i + ¶ + -¶ ³ + / ) 0
~
( , the land demand for idling under GAECs is null and 
the three demand functions are defined by equations (21a) to (21c). 
(ii) When  b g h CJ v r i i + ¶ + -¶ £ + / ) 0
~
( , the land demand for idling under GAECs is positive 
and the three demand functions can be expressed as: 
i i h h
~
= ,  (22a) 
b v r g g h CJ i i i - + = ¶ + ¶ - / )
~
( ,   (22b) 
i i i g h n + =
~
.  (22c) 
Figure 4 presents the demand functions for cultivated hectares, idled hectares under GAECs 
and  entitlements  in  this  second  sub-case  when  0 / )
~
( > + ¶ ¶ - b h h CJ i i .  The  land  demand 
function  for  cultivation  corresponds  to  the  broken  line  i h AB
~
:  for  a  price  sum Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
 
  28 
b h h CJ v r i i + ¶ -¶ ³ + / )
~
( ) (
) 1 ( , the land quantity demanded for cultivation (
) 1 (
i h ) is identical to 
the total land quantity  demanded ignoring the possibility not to produce; for a price sum 
b h h CJ v r i i + ¶ -¶ < + / )
~
( ) (
) 2 ( , the land quantity demanded for cultivation is limited to the 
threshold  i h
~
,  the  land  quantity  demanded  for  idling  under  GAECs  is  strictly  positive 
( 0
) 2 ( > i g ), and the total land quantity demanded is greater than the land quantity the farmer 
would have demanded ignoring the possibility not to produce while benefiting from payment 
entitlements (
) 2 ( ) 2 ( ~
i i i h g h < + , where 
) 2 (
i h  is solution of 
) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) ( / ) ( v r b h hi i + = + ¶ ¶p ). 
 
Market equilibriums 
We only consider the “interesting” case where the demand for idled hectares under GAECs 
can be positive. More specifically, we assume that the following condition is met for both 
farmers 1 and 2: 
(condition i)  b g h CJ i i + ¶ + -¶ £ / ) 0
~
( 0 .  
By definition of  i h
~













wp h H h H . But  H
~
 can be 
lower than, equal to or greater than 
b H . As a result, the two orderings are possible: either 
H H H
b wp ~
£ < , or 
b wp H H H £ <
~
. In what follows, we do not explicitly consider the first 
orderings which leads to a land demand for idling under GAECs equal to zero at equilibrium: 
we are brought back to the policy situation considered in the previous sub-section which 
ignored the possibility not to produce. We only explicitly consider the second ordering which 
leads  us  to  distinguish  four  regimes  depending  on  whether 
wp H N £
0 ,  H N H
wp ~ 0 £ £ , 
G H N H
~ ~ ~ 0 + £ £  or 
0 ~ ~
N G H £ +  where the threshold G
~
















i i i r L r b g g h CJ = + ¶ + -¶ ∑
=
- .  (23a) 
 
 
                                                 
21 The threshold  G
~
 corresponds to the number of hectares that are demanded for idling under GAECs in a 
policy regime where income support is granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  and production 
is not required. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Figure 4. Individual land demands for cultivation and idling when the condition  0 / ) ( / ) (
2 2 2 2 < ¶ ¶ < ¶ ¶ h h CJ h h i i i i p  and 
0 / )
~
( > + ¶ ¶ - b h h CJ i i  are fulfilled. 
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We successively consider the four regimes which are illustrated by Figure 5. The latter is 
drawn  in  the  simplified  case  where  producers  1  and 2  are  assumed  identical  in  terms  of 
production, cost and profit structures; they can however differ in terms of initial endowments 
in entitlements. 
Regime 1.  ) (
0 wp wp r L H N = £  
In that first regime illustrated by the limit case where 
wp H N N = =
) 1 ( 0 0 on Figure 5, the land 
demanded  for  idling  under  GAECs  equals  zero.  Equilibrium  conditions  are  defined  by 
equations (12a) to (12e) and Proposition 2 holds. In that first regime, the SPS has no impact 
on individual land demands for cultivation, on total land demanded for cultivation and on the 
equilibrium land rental price. There are entitlement exchanges at a unit price  b v
s =  from the 
over-endowed producer (if he exists) towards the under-endowed producer (if he exists). 
 
Regime 2.  H N H
wp ~ 0 £ £  
In that second regime illustrated by a number of entitlements set to 
) 2 ( 0 N  on Figure 5, the 
land  demanded  for  idling  is  still  equal  to  zero.  Equilibrium  conditions  are  defined  by 
equations (13a) to (13f), except that 
b H  should be replaced by  H
~
, and Proposition 3 holds. 
In  that  second  regime,  the  SPS  has  a  positive  impact  on  individual  land  demands  for 
cultivation, on total land demand for cultivation and on the equilibrium land price (relative to 
the no-support regime). Payments partially capitalize in land prices: the higher the number of 
entitlements,  the  greater  the  capitalization  in  land  prices.  Payments  also  capitalize  in 
entitlement  exchange  prices:  the  higher  the  number  of  entitlements,  the  lower  the 
capitalization in entitlement prices.  
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Figure 5. Land market equilibria in the SFP support regime for different initial global endowments in entitlements
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wp H  is the total area demanded in the zero support regime, 
b H  is the total number of hectares that would be demanded in a policy regime where support 
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Regime 3.  G H N H
~ ~ ~ 0 + £ £  
In that third regime illustrated by a number of entitlements set to 
) 3 ( 0 N  on Figure 5, the land 
quantity demanded for idling under GAECs is positive. More specifically, for a number of 
entitlements set to 
) 3 ( 0 N , the land market equilibrium occurs at point 
) 3 ( s E  which corresponds 
to a land price of 
wp s s r r r > >
) 2 ( ) 3 (  and a land quantity used in the agricultural sector of 
wp H N N > >
) 2 ( 0 ) 3 ( 0 : among these 
) 3 ( 0 N  hectares,  H
~
 hectares are effectively demanded for 
cultivation and  H N G
s ~ ) 3 ( 0 ) 3 ( - =  are demanded for idling under GAECs. All entitlements are 
activated, and there are entitlement exchanges at a unit price  b v v
s s < <
) 2 ( ) 3 (  from the over-
endowed farmer (if he exists) towards the under-endowed farmer (if he exists).  
More generally, equilibrium conditions in that third regime with  G H N H
~ ~ ~ 0 + £ £  can be 
expressed as: 
b v





=  with  i h
~
 defined by  0 ~ / )
~
( / ) ,
~









,  (24c) 
) (
0 s r L N = ,  (24d) 






i i r L v r b m m CJ = + + ¶ -¶ ∑
=
- ,  (24e) 
b v r g g h CJ
s s s
i i i - + = ¶ + ¶ - / )
~
( ,  (24f) 













i g h n + =
~
,  (24h) 







+ £ = ∑
=
.  (24i) 
Equation  (24d)  defines  the  equilibrium  land  rental price  while  equation  (24e)  defines  the 
equilibrium entitlement rental price, once the equilibrium land price is determined. Equations 
(24b)  and  (24c)  define  the  individual  and  total  land  demand  functions  for  cultivation, 
respectively. Equation (24f) defines the individual land demand functions for idling under Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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GAECs and equation (24g) defines the total land demand for idling under GAECs. Finally, 
equations (24h) and (24i) define the individual and aggregate entitlement demand functions, 
respectively. 
Payments capitalize in land and entitlement prices; the degree of capitalization in land prices 
(respectively, entitlement prices) increases (decreases) with the number of entitlements; in the 
upper limit case corresponding to a number of entitlements 
0 N  set to  G H
~ ~
+ , capitalization 
in land prices is maximum while capitalization in entitlement prices is null ( 0 =
s v ).  
Relative to the zero support regime, one immediately notes that the SPS has a positive effect 
on the number of hectares in cultivation (
wp H H >
~
): the SPS is not decoupled at the extensive 
margin of production. More interesting is the comparison of the SPS with a policy regime 
where support is granted through per-hectare direct aids of unit amount  b  assuming that 
production is required to benefit from these area payments. In that alternative policy regime, 
there is no land demanded for idling and the land demanded for cultivation is equal to 
b H . 
Recalling that we assumed here that 
b H H <
~
, one verifies that  G H H
b ~ ~
+ < : Total land used 
in the agricultural sector is greater in the SPF policy regime relative to the regime of per-
hectare direct aids, but part of the land demanded is not cultivated so that the number of 




N G H £ +  
In  that  fourth  regime  illustrated  by  the  limit  case  where  G H N
~ ~ ) 4 ( 0 + =   on  Figure  5,  the 
number of hectares demanded for cultivation is  H
~
, the number of hectares demanded for 
idling under GAECs is G
~
, the land equilibrium price is equal to 
G r  (payment capitalization 
in land prices is maximum) and the entitlement equilibrium price is equal to zero (payment 
capitalization in entitlement prices is null). There is an excess of entitlements relative to the 
total number of hectares used in the agricultural sector: the quantity  0 )
~ ~
(
0 ³ + - G H N  of 
entitlements is not activated. 
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4.  Implications and concluding remarks 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis developed in the previous section is 
that the very nature of the new CAP SFP scheme adopted in the EU in 2003 crucially depends 
on the total number of entitlements which are initially made available. Two situations have to 
be  distinguished  depending  on  the  relative  positions  of  (i)  the  aggregate  marginal  profit 
function,  (ii)  the  aggregate  marginal  cost  function  of  maintaining  non-cultivated  land  in 
GAECs and (iii) the aggregate marginal land supply function. These two cases are illustrated 
in the two panels of Figure 6 which helps summarising and interpreting our findings. 
The first case (panel a of Figure 6) corresponds to the situation where the number of hectares 
that  would  be  demanded  for  cultivation  in  a  policy  regime  where  the  support  is  granted 
through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  and production is not required is greater than 
the number of hectares that would be demanded in the same policy regime but production is 
required (case where 
b H H ³
~
). Then: 
-  when  the  initial  number  of  entitlements  is  lower  than  or  equal  to  the  number  of 
hectares that would be demanded by farmers for cultivation in a regime where no support is 
granted  (
wp H N £
0 ),  SFP  entitlements  work  as  lump-sum  transfers  which  only  have  the 
effect of raising farmers’ income: relative to the zero support regime, neither do they modify 
the amount of land that is demanded, nor do they capitalize into the land rental price. 
-  when  the  initial  number  of  entitlements  is  greater than  or  equal  to  the number  of 
hectares that would be demanded by farmers for cultivation in a zero support regime and 
lower than or equal to the number of hectares that would be demanded for cultivation in a 
policy regime where the support is granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  
and  production  is  required  (
b wp H N H £ £
0 ),  SFP  entitlements  work  as  direct  aids  per 
hectare that would be granted on a binding base area (defined as 
0 N  hectares): the total land 
demanded for production increases to the base area 
0 N  and the land rental price raises as part 
of the support granted through SFP entitlements capitalize into it. 
-  eventually, when the initial number of entitlements is greater than or  equal to the 
number of hectares that would be demanded by farmers for cultivation in a policy regime 
where the support is granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  and production 
is required (
0 N H
b £ ), SFP entitlements work just as unlimited direct aids per hectare: the 
total land demanded for production is 
b H , the capitalization of support into the land rental Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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price is complete, and the base-area-equivalent 
0 N  is no longer binding so that a quantity of 
b H N -
0  entitlements is not activated. 
 
The second case (panel b of Figure 6) takes place when the number of hectares that would be 
demanded for cultivation in a policy regime where the support is granted through direct aids 
per hectare of unit amount  b  and production is not required is lower than the number of 
hectares that would be demanded in the same policy regime but production is required (case 
where 
b H H £
~
). Then: 
-  when  the  initial  number  of  entitlements  is  lower  than  or  equal  to  the  number  of 
hectares that would be demanded by farmers for cultivation in a regime where no support is 
granted (
wp H N £
0 ), SFP entitlements work as lump-sum transfers. 
-  when  the  initial  number  of  entitlements  is  greater than  or  equal  to  the number  of 
hectares that would be demanded by farmers for cultivation in a zero support regime and 
lower than or equal to the number of hectares that would be demanded for cultivation in a 
policy regime where the support is granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  
and production is not required ( H N H
wp ~ 0 £ £ ), SFP entitlements work as direct aids per 
hectare that would be granted on a binding base-area-equivalent of 
0 N  hectares. 
-  when  the  initial  number  of  entitlements  is  greater than  or  equal  to  the number  of 
hectares demanded for cultivation and lower than or equal to the total number of hectares 
demanded (for cultivation or idling) in a policy regime where the support is granted through 
direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  and production is not required ( G H N H
~ ~ ~ 0 + £ £ ), 
SFP  entitlements  have  three  effects:  first,  they  induce  an  aggregate  land  demand  for 
cultivation of  H
~
 which is greater than the demand that would occur in the zero support 
regime  ( H H
wp ~
£ ),  but  to  a  lesser  extent  than  direct  aids  per  hectare  would  (
b H H £
~
); 
second, the total land demanded is constrained by the base-area-equivalent 
0 N  and part of 
this land ( H N
~ 0 - ) is idled; third, the land rental price is raised relative to the zero support 
regime.Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Figure 6. Land and SFP entitlement rental prices as functions of the global initial number of entitlements 
(a). 
  Panel a - When H
~
 is such that  H H H
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wp H  is the total area demanded in a zero support regime, 
b H  is the total number of hectares that would be demanded in a policy regime where support 




 are the numbers of hectares that would be demanded for cultivation and 
idling under GAECs, respectively, in a policy regime where income support is granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount b  and production is not 
required. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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-  ultimately, when the initial number of entitlements is greater than or equal to the total 
number of hectares that would be demanded by farmers (for cultivation or idling) in a policy 
regime where the support is granted through direct aids per hectare of unit amount  b  and 
production  is  not  required  (
0 ~ ~
N G H £ + ),  H
~
  hectares  are  demanded  for  cultivation,  G
~
 
hectares are demanded for idling under GAECs, the capitalization of support into the land 
rental price is complete, and there exists a quantity of  )
~ ~
(
0 G H N + -  entitlements which is not 
activated. 
Recommendations to modellers can be drawn from this analysis. First, since the SPS does not 
build on a zero support regime but inherits from the previous 1992-1999 reforms, it is our 
belief that SFP entitlements should not be modelled as lump-sum transfers; in other words, we 
think that there is little chance that, empirically, 
wp H N £
0  in the EU. Second, if we thus 
hypothesise that most likely 
0 N H
wp £ , we have seen that it is then relevant to model the SFP 
entitlements as “more decoupled” direct aids per hectare: “more decoupled” means that the 
impact  of  the  support  granted  through  SFP  entitlements,  both  in  terms  of  aggregate  land 
demand for cultivation and capitalisation into the land rental price, is smaller than the one of 
true direct payments per hectare of the same unit amount (either because the total number of 
available entitlements acts as a binding base area, or because the possibility not to produce 
reduces the demand for cultivation). Therefore, for models that cannot fully represent the 
working of the joint land and entitlements markets and the voluntary idling of land as we did 
it in this article, the “coupling factor” strategy appears to be a suitable solution; however, 
calibrating  the  coefficient  that  weights  the  unit  value  of  entitlements  is  an  empirical,  yet 
difficult, task. Still, modellers who do represent the land market but do not incorporate the 
possibility of voluntary idling must keep in mind that they might underestimate the impact of 
SFP entitlements on the land rental price when the latter are introduced as weighted direct 
aids  per  hectare:  we  have  seen  that,  when  some  hectares  are  demanded  for  idling  under 
GAECs,  the  total  demand  for  land  induced  by  the  SPS  overruns  the  sole  demand  for 
cultivation induced by “more decoupled” aids per hectare only. 
Finally, we would like to raise the issue that, in reality, the situation is even more complex: all 
other  things  equal,  when,  for  some  reasons,  the  aggregate  demand  for  cultivated  land  is 
translated to the right, the three values of 
wp H ,  H
~
 and 
b H  move accordingly; in the mean 
time, G
~
 decreases so that the quantity  G H
~ ~
+  holds constant. The recent and sharp increase 
in (most) agricultural prices is an illustration of this process; the same reasoning would be Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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true when comparing regions exhibiting different efficiency levels in production or different 
costs of maintaining land in GAECs. In other words, it appears that the bounds of the intervals 
over which the SFP entitlements should be regarded as lump-sum transfers or weighted area 
payments,  and  the  magnitude  of  this  weight  when  convenient,  should  in  practice  be  an 
endogenous feature of the model. 
No need to invent something else! Modelling SFPs as lump-sum transfers or area payments 
shall  suffice…  as  long  as  the  implications  of  modelling  choices  are  well  borne  in  mind, 
notably in models that are not able to capture all the subtleties of the SPS because of their 
incomplete representation of the land market.   Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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Annex  
We define equilibrium conditions for the first regime only, i.e., when  ) (
rw wp r L H N = £ °  
(regime  1).  Proofs  proceed  in  the  same  way  in  the  two  other  regimes,  i.e.,  when 
b rw wp H N r L H £ £ =
0 ) (  (regime 2) and when 
0 N H
b <  (regime 3): they are available upon 
request.  
 
Equilibrium conditions of regime 1 when  ) (
rw wp r L H N = £ °  
 
Case 1-a:  b v
s <  
In  that  case,  land  and  entitlement  demand  functions  by  farmers  1  and  2  are  defined  by 
conditions (11a) in the text. 












i l r w p h l b v r w p h ∑ ∑
= =
£ - +   which  means 
that total land used in the agricultural sector is lower or equal in the SFP support regime 
relative  to  the  zero  support  situation.  Hence, 
wp s s r b v r ³ - + ,  or,  equivalently, 
wp s wp s r b v r r > + - ³   because  b v
s < .  As  a  result,  ) ( ) (
wp s r L r L > ,  i.e.,  the  total  land 
supply to the agricultural sector increases which contradicts the initial assumption (1-a-i) that 
total land demanded by the farm sector is lower or equal in the SFP support regime relative to 
the zero support reference situation.  












i l r w p h l b v r w p h ∑ ∑
= =
> - + , i.e., that total 
land used in the agricultural sector is strictly greater in the SFP support regime relative to the 












i l b v r w p h n - + =∑ ∑
= =
.  But,  by 













i l r w p h r L N n ∑ ∑
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contradicts the assumption (1-a-ii) that total land used in the agricultural sector is strictly 
greater increases in the SFP support regime relative to the zero support reference situation.  
 
Case I-b:  b v
s >  
In  that  case,  land  and  entitlement  demand  functions  by  farmers  1  and  2  are  defined  by 
conditions (11c) in the text. From (11c), we have  0 =
s
i n  which means that each farmer sells 
all  his  initial  endowment  in  entitlements  at  a  strictly  positive  price  0 > > b v
s .  This  is 
impossible because there is no entitlement demand. 
 
 
Case I-c:  b v
s =  
The only possible case is thus characterized by an equilibrium price of entitlements equal to 
their (common) unit value, i.e.,  b v
s = . In that case, land and entitlement demands by farmers 
1 and 2 are defined by conditions (11b) in the text. 
We thus have  b v




i ¶ -¶ = / ) , , , ( q  (equation 







i r L l r w p h = ∑
=
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 (equation (12e) in 
the text): the inequality 
wp H N £
0  directly follows from the definition of the regime, while 









  follows  from  the  fact  that  there  is  a  deficit  in  entitlements  with 
respect to the number of hectares demanded by the agricultural sector (
s wp H H N = £
0 ): Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
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-  When both farmers 1 and 2 are under-endowed (in the sense where 
s
i i h n £
0 ), there is 
no  entitlement  exchange:  each  farmer  activates  all  his  initial  endowment  in 
entitlements and the equilibrium rental price of entitlements is a virtual price.  
-  When  one  of  the  farmers  is  strictly  under-endowed  (say 
s h n 1
0
1 < ),  then  the  other 
farmer  is  necessarily  strictly  over-endowed  (
s h n 2
0
2 > )  and  there  is  entitlement 
exchange (at a market price of  b v
s = ) from the over-endowed towards the under-





1 1 n h n h
wp s - = - ) which is bought by the under-endowed farmer 2. 
As a result, 








1 ) ( ) ( . 
 
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 
  45 
Les Working Papers SMART – LERECO sont produits par l’UMR SMART et l’UR LERECO 
 
·  UMR SMART 
L’Unité Mixte de Recherche (UMR 1302) Structures et Marchés Agricoles, Ressources 
et  Territoires  comprend  l’unité  de  recherche  d’Economie  et  Sociologie  Rurales  de 
l’INRA  de  Rennes  et  le  département  d’Economie  Rurale  et  Gestion  d’Agrocampus 
Ouest. 
Adresse : 
UMR SMART - INRA, 4 allée Bobierre, CS 61103, 35011 Rennes cedex 
UMR SMART - Agrocampus, 65 rue de Saint Brieuc, CS 84215, 35042 Rennes cedex 
http://www.rennes.inra.fr/smart 
 
·  LERECO 
Unité de Recherche Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherches en Economie 
Adresse : 









The Working Papers SMART – LERECO are produced by UMR SMART and UR LERECO 
 
·  UMR SMART 
The  « Mixed  Unit  of  Research »  (UMR1302)  Structures  and  Markets  in  Agriculture, 
Resources and Territories, is composed of the research unit of Rural Economics and 
Sociology  of  INRA  Rennes  and  of  the  Department  of  Rural  Economics  and 
Management of Agrocampus Ouest. 
  Address: 
  UMR SMART - INRA, 4 allée Bobierre, CS 61103, 35011 Rennes cedex, France 
  UMR SMART - Agrocampus, 65 rue de Saint Brieuc, CS 84215, 35042 Rennes cedex, France 
http://www.rennes.inra.fr/smart_eng/ 
 
·  LERECO 
Research Unit Economic Studies and Research Lab 
Address: 











Working Papers SMART – LERECO 
INRA, UMR SMART 
4 allée Adolphe Bobierre, CS 61103 
35011 Rennes cedex, France 
Email : smart_lereco_wp@rennes.inra.fr 
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 08-01 












































Working Papers SMART – LERECO 
UMR INRA-Agrocampus Ouest SMART (Structures et Marchés Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires) 
UR INRA LERECO (Laboratoires d’Etudes et de Recherches Economiques) 
Rennes, France 